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The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and
Critique of Public Policy and
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Bernard E. Harcourt

ABSTRACT

This essay identifies the systems fallacy: the mistaken belief that systems-analytic decision-
making techniques, such as cost-benefit or public policy analysis, are neutral and objective,
when in fact they normatively shape political outcomes. The systems fallacy is the mistaken
belief that there could be a nonnormative or scientific way to analyze and implement public
policy that would not affect political values. That pretense is mistaken because the very act of
conceptualizing and defining a metaphorical system, and the accompanying choice-of-scope
decisions, constitute inherently normative decisions that are value laden and political in nature. The ambition of decision theorists to render policy implementation neutral and objective
by means of scientific methods was laudable, but there is no way to extract the politics from
the method. The minute we are inattentive to this insight and delegate policy making to
cost-benefit experts and policy professionals, we move one step closer to the systems fallacy.

1. INTRODUCTION

At the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, decision
theorists perfected a decision-making technique called systems analysis
(SA) and began applying it broadly to matters of national defense strategy
and social policy. The brainchild of the RAND Corporation, the method
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of SA extended the logic of operations research (OR), which had been
developed during World War II, from its earlier narrow focus on military
weapons systems to broader matters of defense strategy, governmental
decision-making, and public policy. Systems analysts, as their name suggests, focused on particular operational systems, such as the postal system, the emergency response system, the criminal justice system, or other
social systems. They identified the scope and objectives of these systems
and then collected, quantitatively assessed, and compared alternative policies for optimizing those objectives. The method was designed to be a
neutral, scientific, and objective tool to more efficiently implement normative choices made through the political process. The goal was to put
the science of policy decision-making at the service of democratic politics.
The method of SA had a formative impact on government decisionmaking and on social policy. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara imposed the method broadly on US Department of Defense
decision-making, from weapons system procurement to national defense
strategy, under the rubric of planning, programming, and budgeting systems analysis (PPBS). Within a few years, President Lyndon B. Johnson
directed his budget director to implement PPBS throughout all federal
agencies, extending the reach of systems-analytic methods from defense
to the entire federal government. A series of subsequent executive orders
under Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, as well
as research advances in schools of public policy, would further extend the
use of systems-analytic techniques under the rubric of cost-benefit analyses and regulatory impact statements, which resulted in the contemporary
use of cost-benefit methods across governmental decision-making, especially since the establishment in 1980 of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget within the
Executive Office of the President.
The systems-analytic turn of the mid-20th century shaped the American administrative state. The logic of SA, which infused the field of public policy, is largely responsible for the dominant role that cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) plays today in the US government—or, more generally,
for the fact that cost-benefit reasoning has become the dominant form of
rationality in our contemporary administrative state. The very notion of a
system at the heart of systems-analytic methods—whether in the context
of the criminal justice system, the health care system, the transportation
system, and so on—has become second nature. This has had significant
consequences for politics today.
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The ambition was laudable: to systematize and quantify public policy making in order to reduce costly inefficiencies and eliminate personal
prejudice so that trained policy analysts could implement, rather than interfere with or distort, our political choices made through the democratic
process. But when the systems-analytic methods were extended from the
narrow confines of OR to the broader context of social policy, a fundamental problem arose that has plagued the use of systems-analytic
reasoning since then. The analysis of a metaphorical or figurative social
system, in contrast to a real or tangible system such as an engine or a military weapon, is inevitably going to involve choices regarding the scope
of the metaphorical system that are invariably normative and political
in nature. They are decisions that implicate political values. However,
they are treated as a technical step in the SA and most often delegated
to the systems analysts, public policy professionals, or cost-benefit experts rather than to the democratic political process. And therein lies the
problem: systems-analytic methods are portrayed as scientific, objective,
and neutral tools, when in fact they necessarily entail normative choices
about political values at every key step. When those choices are made by
technocrats, the methods no longer merely implement political decisions.
They no longer serve democratic politics. Instead, the methods reshape
our politics.
To be precise, the scope decisions in an SA include, first, the conceptualization of the metaphorical system and the decision to analyze that
particular system over another; second, the identification of the boundaries of the metaphorical system; third, the determination of the objectives
of the metaphorical system; fourth, the collection of the set of promising
policy alternatives to evaluate in relation to that metaphorical system; and
fifth, the decision of which criteria to use to judge the better functioning
of the metaphorical system. Each of these scope decisions implicates core
political values, and as a result conducting an SA is not a neutral, objective, or apolitical process. The decision to conceptualize and then analyze
a criminal justice system, for instance, rather than another metaphorical
system such as the racial equality system, will necessarily assign certain
political values to central places in the SA (for example, crime prevention,
security, policing, punishment) and relegate other political values to the
margins (for example, racial equality, antidiscrimination, racial harmony,
equal rights). Instead of directly maximizing the latter, an SA focused on
the criminal justice system may indirectly undermine those political values because they are not the objective of any recognized system and thus
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will not be maximized—which can result, for instance, in the extreme disparate racial impact of mass incarceration today. Similarly, when certain
alternative policies are included in an SA (for example, broken-windows
policing, mandatory minimum sentences, risk prediction), but not others
(for example, prison education, safe injection sites, trauma care centers),
the resulting policy analysis will maximize certain political values and
not others. When these scope choices are delegated to systems analysts
or public policy experts, rather than determined by a political process,
there is an inversion of the democratic ideal: instead of politics fixing priorities and public policy analysis neutrally implementing those political
decisions, the experts and policy professionals silently impose political
values on society.
This danger comprises what I call the systems fallacy: the mistaken
belief that systems-analytic methods are neutral, when in fact they normatively shape politics. And even though there is little pure SA being conducted today, the systems fallacy still plagues styles of decision-making
that draw on the logic of systems-analytic methods. This is true of contemporary public policy methods, which begin, as in all systems analyses,
with the policy analyst collecting a set of promising alternatives, instead
of leaving that value-laden choice-of-scope decision to politics. It is also
true of CBA more generally—including recent, reconstructed approaches
to CBA.
Certain contemporary proponents of CBA have offered chastened
versions of the method in an effort to address criticisms. They have, for
instance, recharacterized the method as merely a second-best but realistic decisional tool, introduced certain limits to quantification, and
urged retrospective and reiterative analyses. However, even here, if the
cost-benefit analyst retains control over which policies to compare, or
over the other scope decisions, there is a remnant of the systems fallacy
that continues to plague these reconstructive projects. In effect, there is a
systems fallacy remainder that should make one skeptical of the current
use of reconstructed CBA.
By recovering the roots of contemporary CBA in OR and reexamining
carefully the flaws of the systems-analytic method—in effect, by identifying a systems fallacy—it may be possible to better evaluate ongoing quantitative practices and identify their proper limits. Let me emphasize that
nothing in this article should be interpreted as a criticism of being systematic. The systems fallacy is a critique of SA and its derivatives, not of being careful, rigorous, or systematic in one’s thought, logic, or argumenta-
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tion. On the contrary, the critique at the heart of this article—the systems
fallacy—requires rigor and systematicity to understand it properly.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, it traces a genealogy of
the cost-benefit approach going back to OR and the invention of SA with
a case study of the emergence of the criminal justice system. In Section 3,
it demonstrates the fallacy of systems thought. It then discusses, in Section 4, the implications for the field of public policy. In Section 5, it suggests directions for the proper use of quantification in decision-making,
and, in a short conclusion, it points to ways forward that avoid the systems fallacy.

2. A GENEALOGY OF SYSTEMS THOUGHT

Military weapons SA, or what was originally called OR, was developed
during World War II as a way to “provide quantitative aids to defense decision makers” with the goal of “optimizing the operational employment
of existing weapons (or other military) systems” (Smith 1966, p. 6). The
“distinctive approach,” according to the Operational Research Society of
Great Britain (1962, p. 282), was “to develop a scientific model of the
system, incorporating measurements of factors such as change and risk,
with which to predict and compare the outcomes of alternative decisions,
strategies or controls.”1 Famous early applications of OR include studies
of the placement and use of aircraft-detection radar devices and of antisubmarine tactics involving depth-charge explosions in the early phases of
World War II. A classic example of OR involves, for instance, the US Air
Force’s studies of bombing accuracy in the Pacific theater. These involved
detailed statistical analyses of the key variables that affect the accuracy of
aerial bombings, including the altitude at which the planes were flying,
the visibility conditions, the wind conditions, the number and formation
of planes, and the cloud strata. Weather clearly has a lot to do with accuracy, especially for visual strikes, but the studies revealed that other
strategic factors play an important role as well. Formation and number
of planes are determinative, for instance, as larger formations mean that
later planes were affected by the smoke and dust of earlier aircraft (US
Army Air Force 1945).
Eventually, OR would apply the same mathematical algorithms and
1. In the United Kingdom, where operations research (OR) largely originated, it was
called operational research. For a history of OR, see Kirby (2003); Amadae (2003).
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models to larger management problems, such as the efficient determination of postal routes or warehouse stock control (Quade 1966, p. 3).
From this larger perspective, OR could best be understood, again in
the words of the Operational Research Society of Great Britain (1962,
p. 282), as “the attack of modern science on complex problems arising in
the direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials and money in industry, business, government and defense. . . . The
purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.” The central question was how to optimize efficiency where the
measure of efficiency was clearly defined, or, as Edward S. Quade of the
RAND Corporation would explain, how “to increase the efficiency of a
man-machine system in a situation where it is clear what ‘more efficient’
means” (Quade 1966, p. 3).
During the 1950s, Quade, Alain Enthoven, Charles Hitch, and others
at the RAND Corporation would extend this method of analysis from
the narrow field of OR, where it had originated, to defense strategy more
broadly—essentially, from deciding, for instance, the optimal altitude for
a bombing mission to determining broader nuclear engagement policy.
The broader application would become known as SA. Systems analysis
was often confused with OR, from which it evolved, but it was distinct
in several regards. Operations research tended to have more elaborate
mathematical models and solve lower-level problems (Smith 1966, p. 8);
in SA, by contrast, the pure mathematical computation was generally
applied only to subparts of the overall problem. Moreover, SA took on
larger strategic questions that implicated choices between major policy
options. In this sense, SA was originally “less quantitative in method and
more oriented toward the analysis of broad strategic and policy questions” (Smith 1966, p. 8).
2.1. The Logic of Systems Analysis

The logic of SA was straightforward and could be depicted in a simple
model. A decision maker identified a particular problem to address within
a particular social sphere—or what was called a system—and defined the
system’s objectives. With those objectives in mind, the decision maker
would then set the proper criteria to evaluate promising policy alternatives. The formal analysis, then, involved five steps: in step 1, the decision maker collected a set of promising alternative policies, each of which
could possibly advance the objectives of the system. Each policy was then
filtered, in step 2, through a model or a set of models to assess its indi-
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vidual attributes in terms, for example, of maintenance costs, manpower
requirements, communication capabilities, and so on. This produced each
policy’s level of effectiveness and cost in step 3, which could then be compared using a metric or the criteria in step 4, which would then turn out,
as the output in step 5, the relative rank of each policy compared with
the others. The output was the correct ordinal ranking of the alternative
policies. To perfect the method, the operation could be reiterated to test
for sensitivity, question assumptions, reexamine objectives, explore alternatives, and tweak the model. Quade (1966, figure 1) depicts well the five
key steps of the analytic decision-making method (see Figure 1).
Trained in OR during World War II, Robert McNamara would impose this systems-analytic method, under the rubric of PPBS, on all military procurement and defense strategies when he took office as secretary
of defense under President John F. Kennedy in 1961. This represented a
significant expansion of the method—from narrow OR on military weapons systems to broader applications of SA to defense strategy—and it
generated a lot of resistance within the military establishment, targeted
primarily at the controversial figure of McNamara himself. But, in the
opinion of Quade (1966, p. 2), by 1966 “there ha[d] been substantial
progress, and the years since 1961 have seen a marked increase in the
extent to which analyses of policy and strategy have influenced decisionmakers on the broadest issues of national defense.”
Johnson would expand the reach of the systems-analytic method even
further, announcing in a statement to members of his cabinet and heads
of federal executive agencies on August 25, 1965, that he had instructed
his budget director, Charles Schultze, to implement the PPBS method
throughout all federal agencies. Johnson emphasized that PPBS would
“identify national goals with precision and on a continuing basis,” help
“search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at
the least cost,” and accurately “measure the performance of programs to
insure a dollar’s worth of service for each dollar spent” (US General Accounting Office 1969, p. 4).
This additional expansion of SA to all governmental decision-making
was even more significant—or, in the words of Quade (1966, p. 2), “even
more radical”—than the earlier expansion of OR. It carried the possibility
of major innovation. As Quade (1966, p. 7) explains, alternative policies
are not always “obvious substitutes for one another,” nor do they always
“perform the same specific function.” It might turn out, for instance, that
as a matter of social policy “education, antipoverty measures, police pro-
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tection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile
delinquency” (Quade 1966, p. 7). Any of those alternative policies might
be called for by rigorous analysis. In other words, policing and education
are fungible substitutes, and either one may be called for on the basis of
the cost-effective pursuit of the objectives of the juvenile justice system—
based on an SA. Moreover, systems-analytic methods may give one the
tools to decide whether “additional money might be better spent on space
exploration or economic opportunity programs” or whether to “reduce
unemployment to less than 2% in two years or add a certain number of
miles to the interstate highway system” (Quade 1966, pp. 18, 4–5).
In effect, according to its proponents, SA would allow trained analysts to put aside their own personal preferences, subjective values, and
partisan politics and instead neutrally and efficiently implement political choices. As RAND colleague and later secretary of defense James R.
Schlesinger explained, “[SA] eliminates the purely subjective approach
on the part of devotees of a program and forces them to change their
lines of argument. They must talk about reality rather than morality”
(Schlesinger 1963, p. 314). With this new method, Schlesinger suggested,
a neutral answer would emerge from an analysis of cost and effectiveness.
All that was needed was a narrow and precise objective.
While Johnson was the first to impose cost-benefit accounting on federal agencies, only a decade later Carter’s Executive Order No. 12,044
(43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 [March 24, 1978]) tasked all executive agencies
with the duty to conduct economic impact studies of all major government regulations. Reagan’s Executive Order No. 12,291 (46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 [February 17, 1981]) assigned the responsibility to the Office of
Management and Budget, which now oversees and coordinates economic
impact analyses. Clinton continued in this tradition with Executive Order No. 12,866 (58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 [October 4, 1993]), which required
economic impact analyses of all significant regulations. And in 2011,
President Barack Obama “renewed and deepened the commitment to
quantitative, evidence-based analysis, and added a number of additional
requirements to improve regulatory review, directing agencies ‘to use the
best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as possible’ in order to achieve regulatory
ends” (Clarke et al. 2014, pp. 50–53). The influence of SA continues to
the present as the method has evolved in public policy and CBA. The
commitment to quantitative, evidence-based, and modeled methods re-
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mains strong, even as some aspects of CBA have been updated and now
include more retrospective analysis.
2.2. A Case Study from the Criminal Justice System

During the Progressive Era, reformers had already gravitated toward an
early notion of systems, especially with regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders.2 One of the first uses of the term “criminal justice system”
occurred in Youth in the Toils, a study conducted on behalf of the Delinquency Committee of the New York City Boys Bureau (Harrison and
Grant 1938). In the following years, the term would be used in several
other publications, each time to refer again to the problem of juvenile delinquency (Ellingston 1948; Phillips 1942; MacCormick 1942).
Those early references to a criminal justice system would gain traction with the emergence of SA at midcentury such that, by the 1960s,
the field of criminal justice began to be understood as a relatively enclosed system in which particular sets of actors (police officers, prosecutors, judges, probation officers, correctional guards, wardens, parole
board members, and so on) operate a defined set of institutions (police
forces, courts, jails, prisons, parole supervision, and so on) to promote
a distinct set of systems objectives (crime control, population management, servicing needs, and so on) and produce a functioning system (see,
for example, the graphic representation of the criminal justice system in
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice [1967, p. 8]).
Systems analysis played a key role in crystalizing the notion of a
“criminal justice system,” and a genealogic link can be traced at both the
individual and institutional levels. Alfred Blumstein, for instance, a towering figure in American criminology, began as an operations researcher,
was president of the Operations Research Society of America, and considers himself an “OR missionary”—tellingly, his appointment at Carnegie Mellon is University Professor of Urban Systems and Operations
Research, Emeritus (Blumstein 2007). Institutions also sprang up early to
analyze the criminal justice system, as illustrated, for example, by the creation in 1966 under Mayor John Lindsay of the New York City–RAND
Institute, a joint project of the city and the RAND Corporation (Light
2003, pp. 68–72).
2. For a detailed history of the concept, discussion of the criminal justice system’s
relation to judicial decision-making, and the ramifications for law and public policy, see
Harcourt (2013, 2014).
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Lindsay took office in 1966 promising to bring the PPBS method to
New York City “to improve budgeting and operations” (Light 2003,
p. 67). At the time, violent crime in the city was on the rise, and the problem of crime was particularly acute in public housing projects (see, for
example, Rosenthal 1972; Seigel 1972). So Lindsay invited the RAND
Corporation to develop new strategies to reduce crime.
The New York City–RAND Institute immediately began to tackle the
crime problem with a number of highly technical OR reports with titles
such as “A Hypercube Queueing Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services” (Larson 1973), “Response of
Emergency Units: The Effects of Barriers, Discrete Streets, and One-Way
Streets” (Larson 1971), “Analysis of the Night and Weekend Arraignment Parts in the Bronx and Queens Criminal Courts” (Jennings 1973),
and “Determining the Travel Characteristics of Emergency Service Vehicles” (Hausner 1975). These studies resembled the early applications of
OR outside the military to matters such as determining “how Post Office pick-up trucks should be routed to collect mail from deposit boxes,
or whether computers should be rented or purchased . . . , or what type
of all-weather landing system should be installed in new commercial aircraft” (Quade 1966, p. 3).
Gradually, and interspersed in these OR reports, the New York City–
RAND Institute began publishing a number of SA-style studies. An illustrative study was Michael I. Liechenstein’s report issued in June 1971,
which addressed the objective of reducing crime in public housing.
Liechenstein (1971, p. 4) took a “broad operational view of a security system” and identified promising policy alternatives, including tenant
training and education, tenant patrols, tenant qualifications to live in the
projects, extended recreational opportunities for teenagers, rent rebates,
elaborate building-entry restrictions, locked lobbies, intrusion detectors,
weapon detectors, surveillance, and increased police or guard manning.
In order to compare security systems, Liechenstein (1971, p. 5) developed
“effectiveness criteria” and then attached those to “compatibility and
cost criteria to derive estimates of an overall figure of merit (e.g., the ratio
of effectiveness-to-cost with a constraint on either minimum effectiveness
or maximum cost).” Liechenstein (1971, p. 6) also identified cost-benefit
criteria: “[r]esearch and development cost (equipment, maintenance, administration before production)[, c]apital cost (equipment, maintenance,
and administrative costs during production)[, o]perating cost (equipment,
maintenance, administration costs during use)[, s]crap value (residual
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Figure 2. Average effectiveness-to-cost ratios of security options (Liechenstein 1971,
p. 23).

value at end of use)[, e]xpected total benefit.” Liechenstein then ran an
SA and generated a graph of the cost-effectiveness of 15 alternatives (see
Figure 2).
Liechenstein had originally identified alternatives that reflected varied political values—from education for low-income tenants on issues of
criminal offending and self-defense, to providing recreational facilities for
poor urban teenagers, to offering subsidies and other financial incentives,
to raising admissibility and tenure standards for housing assistance, to
increased police presence. They included everything from education to
recreation, to target hardening, to policing. But on the basis of the SA,
Liechenstein found that the most effective measure was an increase in the
police force and more guards.3
New York City implemented these policies, focusing precisely on
increased policing and personnel. Simeon Golar, chairman of the New
York City Housing Authority, instituted a “‘100-man mobile task force’
consisting of 40 housing policemen and the hiring of 60 new policemen”
(New York Times 1971), and there followed a $500,000 initiative to hire
3. The study ultimately suggested that the most effective security measures—extensive
surveillance, increased policing, and posting of armed guards at each building—were too
expensive (Liechenstein 1971, p. 24) and, as a result, did not specifically endorse the security measures. Instead, the study intimates that there is a need for more systems-analytic
research like that of the New York City–RAND Institute (Liechenstein 1971, p. 24). Nevertheless, the city implemented the policies that topped Liechenstein’s study.
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armed and unarmed guards for the city’s housing projects and a $1 million allocation for security and surveillance equipment (Ranzal 1973).
The New York City–RAND Institute ultimately folded in 1975 amid
significant controversy, ironically, over Lindsay’s profligate spending on
consultants (Light 2003, p. 74). But the notion of the criminal justice
system would stick, and the systems-analytic approach would lead to a
number of institutions and think tanks, across the political spectrum, that
would take as their object the criminal justice system—such as the Vera
Institute of Justice, the Urban Institute, the Police Foundation, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Institute for Law and Justice, to
name a few. Today, the idea that there exists such a thing as the criminal
justice system has become so dominant that practically everyone thinks
about crime and punishment through a systems-analytic lens and uses
this language and logic in a secondhand way.

3. THE PROBLEM WITH SYSTEMS-ANALYTIC REAS ONING

Decision theorists developed systems-analytic methods with the laudable goal of preventing subjective preferences from trumping democratic
choices. Over time, the implementation of these methods was delegated
to professional analysts and public policy experts on the ground that the
methods were neutral and objective, in other words, scientific. But the
core decisions at the heart of systems-analytic methods—namely, the recurring choices of scope at every key step of the analyses—were and remain entirely normative and, as a result, end up shaping political values. The choice to conceptualize a metaphorical system, to define it and
its boundaries, to identify its objectives and criteria, to collect promising
policy alternatives—all these key scope decisions affect the political outcomes. And the moment those choices are delegated to the policy analyst
rather than to the democratic process, the systems-analytic method has
turned on its head the proper relationship between politics and public
policy: instead of public policy implementing democratic political decisions, public policy drives political outcomes and values.
The seed of the problem is illustrated well by the observation in
Quade (1966, p. 7) that “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency.” Notice how the systems analyst here, Quade himself, silently
assumes one particular metaphorical system rather than another (namely,
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a juvenile delinquency system rather than a juvenile welfare system) and
chooses a set of policies without acknowledging that they each embrace
very different political values, such as an educated citizenry and a robust
public sphere (education), political and economic equality (antipoverty
measures), security (police protection), and urban planning (slum clearance). In the process of choosing promising alternatives and excluding
others, Quade effectively defines the scope of the metaphorical system
and its objectives (namely, combating juvenile delinquency, instead of improving the welfare or life opportunities of youths). This is done under
the guise of neutral, scientific policy analysis. Yet the simple act of choosing the set of promising alternatives to compare, and excluding others,
performs normative work—normative work that is hidden behind a veil
of objectivity. The chosen set of alternative policies cuts across multiple
values, and the policy output, if implemented, will necessarily affect and
reshape the balance of political values in our democracy. The choices of
the systems analyst—namely, which metaphorical system to study, which
policy alternatives to include, how to define the boundaries and objectives of the system, which criteria to test—end up shaping societal values.
3.1. The Systems Fallacy

The systems fallacy is the mistaken belief that systems-analytic methods
are neutral and objective. It occurs when one mistakenly assumes that
there is a nonnormative way to identify a metaphorical system, to select
its proper boundaries, or to collect possible policies to compare—in effect, to make any of the key choice-of-scope decisions. In any such analysis, the expert will include some promising policy alternatives that may
change the political landscape (for instance, slum clearance, if that might
entail displacing communities or disrupting family bonds) but invariably
exclude, crowd out, or discount other alternatives, perhaps because they
are more creative or marginal to the system studied. It is precisely when
one forgets that the methods involve normative political choices and assigns them to policy professionals that the systems fallacy problem recurs.
There are a number of other problems with systems logics that have
been well articulated by other critics, especially in the contemporary debate over CBA (Sinden 2004, p. 191; Sinden, Kysar, and Driesen 2009;
Kysar 2007; Farber 2009, p. 1355; Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004). As
others have noted, a systems-analytic approach privileges certain kinds
of quantifiable interests over less quantifiable values. By selecting more
quantifiable objectives and variables (for instance, juvenile delinquency
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rates), which the method itself demands, rather than larger social values
(for instance, youth welfare), and by focusing exclusively on measurable
outcomes, the systems-analytic approach privileges the more quantifiable,
measurable, and instrumental factors in the analysis. Educational alternatives, for instance, often will get short shrift because of the difficulty of
assessing their long-term benefits. Poverty reduction and other soft variables will be more difficult to measure in terms of impact and outcomes.
The hard edge of the systems-analytic approach often favors hard systems.
Another common criticism is that the analysts often do not have the
skills, background, knowledge, or time to implement the type of quantitative analysis necessary to properly identify a best alternative, so they tend
to guesstimate and, in the process, simply confirm their personal biases.
This is the critique expressed by scholars such as Charles Lindblom, who
argues that policy makers just “muddle through,” or Herbert Simon, who
coined the term “satisfice” (Simon 1997; Lindblom 1959, 1979; Rubin
2013, pp. 38–39). These critiques raise the problem of bounded rationality, and they too are undoubtedly correct.
But an equally pressing problem of systems-analytic methods is the
systems fallacy, namely, the fact that choice of scope is never neutral, objective, or scientific but inherently normative and has deep political implications that are masked precisely by the purported scientific nature of the
method. This can be demonstrated using a simple hypothetical.
3.2. A Simple Demonstration

Let me begin with a simple model that assumes, hypothetically, that
Americans in the aggregate would like to distribute their resources in line
with their political values in the following manner: 50 percent to education, 35 percent to health care, and 15 percent to policing. For those who
prefer to rely on revealed preferences, I could hypothesize that these are
actual budgeted expenditures. I emphasize, at the outset, that this particular distribution is itself, of course, the product of socialization; there is
no prepolitical starting point or state of nature. But for purposes of this
simple demonstration, I will start at one historical moment.
At time 1, then, this distribution of preferences (call them revealed
preferences if you prefer, or budgets, utilities, or priorities) corresponds
to a certain weighting of political values that puts a priority first on an
educated and healthy citizenry (call this liberty) and second on security
and orderliness (call this order). Again, to keep it simple and take only
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two values, imagine the relationship as follows: the first value (the liberty
associated with an educated and healthy citizenry, 85 percent) is, under
this hypothetical, more than four times as important as the second value
(the order associated with orderliness and security, 15 percent).
Now suppose that Americans choose to address a social problem
such as crime through a systems-analytic approach. As decision makers,
we begin by identifying the objectives—here, reducing crime most efficiently—and collecting a set of promising alternatives to maximize that
objective. Suppose, for simplicity, that we collect three promising alternatives: investing more in educational programs, increasing the number
of drug rehabilitation programs, or increasing the police force. We then
conduct a detailed CBA and find, hypothetically, that a similar monetary investment will have the greatest return if the third policy, increasing
the police force, is adopted. On the basis of the analysis, we increase the
number of police officers and the budget for police. Now the distribution
of resources or our budget has become, hypothetically, 33 percent investments in police, 33 percent health initiatives, and 33 percent education.
This reallocation of resources and new distribution, at time 2, has affected our political values. As we make those new investments to most
efficiently reduce crime, we are now investing twice as much in policing
than we were before, and this has an effect on the balance of political
values reflected in our society, with order and security now being proportionally more important than before. Focusing on a narrow objective
(crime reduction) and selecting a set of alternative policies (the three that
were chosen) has reshaped our politics. We could, of course, have excluded the third alternative or added others. Those choices will inevitably
affect our political preferences and vision for society—they will alter the
world in which we live. In this sense, the systems-analytic method begins with a limited mission—defining an objective and identifying a set of
promising alternatives—but inevitably reaches much further and transforms our societal balance of political values. It imposes new distributions of values under the guise of science. It displaces political deliberation with policy analysis.
It has done this on the basis of maximizing a social welfare function
and concluding that the gains from policing offset the losses in education
and health. We are assuming, naturally, that at time 1, the marginal benefit of further investment in any one area is equal to the marginal cost for
each sector under a welfare function and that the reallocation at time 2
maximizes the social welfare function. But it is important to emphasize
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that, although our welfare may have been maximized, the new allocation
of resources reflects a different weighting of political values: it produces a
different political landscape.
3.3. The Matter of Partial Maximization

At this point, a proponent of SA might respond that it is easy to ensure
that political preferences are respected and that the analysis takes full account of democratic choices. Suppose that, as a result of the increased
investment in policing, welfare may be lower than what we might have
expected from the drop in crime, because of a shared distaste for living in
a more policed state; in other words, the benefits of reduced crime may
be offset to some degree by the increase in policing. That, a proponent
might argue, can and must be factored into the analysis—and already
has been if the social welfare calculus was properly done. The analysis
would have included in the model the distaste (disutility) associated with
the increased policing. Preferences along these lines can be measured and
quantified and should be made part of the overall calculus. The problem,
in other words, has been addressed by factoring in people’s tastes and
preferences.
Now, of course, if we etch those preferences too deeply into the welfare analysis, then we will simply be back at square one: we will weight
our political preferences so strongly that our values will determine policy
outcomes. If the policy analyst is going to factor in our taste for police
surveillance robustly—as well as all our other tastes for civil liberties, for
equality, for an educated citizenry, and so on—then the model is essentially rigged to produce the outcomes that mirror our values and our original distributions at time 1. The analyst will simply reproduce the landscape at time 1, and there would be no need for SA.
The question thus becomes how deeply to etch preferences into the
model. There is no reason to believe that preferences are unchangeable
and that there could not be any trade-offs. A systems-analytic approach
might find real efficiencies that will result in increased welfare and greater
utility overall even if they shift our balance of political values.
This is the welfare economist’s response—a type of response consistent, for example, with Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s thesis in
Fairness versus Welfare (Kaplow and Shavell 2002). In fact, Kaplow and
Shavell make precisely this argument. As they emphasize, “The conception of individuals’ well-being that we consider, in the tradition of welfare economics, is a comprehensive one. It encompasses not only the di-
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rect benefits that individuals obtain from the consumption of goods and
services, but also individuals’ degrees of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they value” (Kaplow and Shavell
2003, pp. 332–33). As if anticipating the argument here, Kaplow and
Shavell (2003, pp. 333) add, “An implication of our broad definition is
that even tastes for fairness are included: Just as an individual might derive pleasure from art, nature, or fine wine, so might an individual feel
better with the knowledge, for example, that vicious criminals receive
their just deserts.” In other words, welfare economics can incorporate
preferences regarding political values and still optimize by shifting policies around to find efficiencies that can be reinvested along other desired
political dimensions.
This is undoubtedly right, at least at a theoretical level. But the problem is, even from a welfare economist’s perspective, that a systems-
analytic approach then maximizes the wrong thing: it is trying to resolve
one specific, identified social problem instead of trying to maximize general social welfare. In the process, there is absolutely no way to know
whether the resolution of that particular problem has increased or decreased overall welfare or whether there are other policy alternatives related to other social problems that would do better at promoting overall
social welfare.
In other words, from an internal perspective—internal to welfare economics—SA is dangerous: it is trying to optimize the wrong objective.
From a social welfare point of view, it would be crucial not to engage in
partial welfare analyses by focusing on one metaphorical system. To do
so would simply distort overall welfare.4
An illustration may be helpful: suppose that the policy of mass incarceration was cost-effective insofar as it accounted for one-third of the
overall drop in crime in the United States during the 1990s (Levitt 2004,
pp. 178–79; but see Harcourt 2006, pp. 1762–63). Suppose, in fact, that
it was determined to be the most effective policy of all the alternatives
4. This point differs from the other critiques that have been leveled at Kaplow and
Shavell’s argument. See Chang (2000a, 2000b); Craswell (2003), which defends a mixed
theory that privileges fairness in most cases; Dorff (2002); Fallon (2003); Ferzan (2004);
Kornhauser (2003), which challenges the copious definition of well-being that includes
fairness; Singer (2002), which argues that the authors define fairness improperly and create a straw-man argument; Waldron (2003), which challenges the line between distribution and the authors’ definition of fairness and calls for greater attention to the issue of
distribution; and Stewart (2004).
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studied and compared to address the crime problem. Suppose, however,
that the investment itself—more than $50 billion per year, over the course
of 40 years—if it had been invested instead in cancer research, would
have resulted in finding a cure for cancer. The result of the partial SA focusing only on the limited problem of crime, and not on overall welfare,
is that we would have overinvested in prisons and underinvested in cancer research. In effect, it would have produced mass incarceration during
a period marked by low levels of crime (recall that, on these assumptions,
crime would have fallen 66 percent in the 1990s because of other factors;
see Levitt [2004], p. 184), with no cure for cancer. That is clearly a net
loss to society. But it is the direct consequence of having conducted a
partial CBA rather than an overall welfare calculus. It is the result of focusing on one metaphorical system without recognizing the opportunity
costs of investing instead in a more broadly conceived social space.
Another way to think about this is that SA does not address the key
question of how a particular metaphorical social system becomes the focus of the analysis. The problems of crime and the criminal justice system, for instance, were turned into major national issues at a particular
moment in history, in the early 1960s, during Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign and would become key campaign issues for President
Richard Nixon. In part as a backlash to the civil rights movement and for
other reasons—including the rise of the antiwar and other social movements and increasing racial tension—crime and the criminal justice system would become the focus of analysis in the 1960s and trump other
social problems, such as poverty, inadequate public housing, and lack of
proper health care (Beckett 1997). But there was nothing natural about
that. Illiteracy, malnourishment, poverty, racism, inequality, or homelessness could instead have become the pressing social problem and the focus
of SA.
In other words, the choice of which metaphorical social system to analyze and remedy, as well as all the choice-of-scope decisions, have political consequences. The only way to do SA without causing these systemic
distortions would be to do general welfare analysis at the highest and
broadest level. But that, of course, entails other costs that may be prohibitive. Section 5 addresses other possible solutions. For the time being, it is
important to recognize here that the systems-analytic methods themselves
inevitably shape our political landscape. The methods are not scientific,
objective, or neutral, but political.
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4. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Systems-analytic reasoning significantly influenced public policy analysis
and, in some circles today, still dominates the field of public policy. What
was once technical SA in the 1960s has become, for many, the canonical
approach to public policy analysis. Here too, then, one needs to pay attention to the systems fallacy.
4.1. Classical Public Policy Analysis

Public policy analysis was born of the systems-analytic method, and the
canonical expressions of public policy methodology by the leading figures
in the field, such as Eugene Bardach, Thomas Birkland, John Friedman,
and Richard Zeckhauser, mirror Edward Quade’s original model. Edith
Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser set forth the proper sequence of analysis
in their canonic text on public policy analysis, A Primer for Policy Analysis, as follows:
Establishing the Context. What is the underlying problem that must be dealt
with? What specific objectives are to be pursued in confronting this problem?
Laying out the Alternatives. What are the alternative courses of action?
What are the possibilities for gathering further information?
Predicting the Consequences. What are the consequences of each of the
alternative actions? What techniques are relevant for predicting these consequences? If outcomes are uncertain, what is the estimated likelihood of each?
Valuing the Outcomes. By what criteria should we measure success in pursuing each objective? Recognizing that inevitably some alternatives will be superior with respect to certain objectives and inferior with respect to others, how
should different combinations of valued objectives be compared with one another?
Making a Choice. Drawing all aspects of the analysis together, what is the
preferred course of action? (Stockey and Zeckhauser 1978, pp. 5–6)

The five-step method is practically identical to SA. Underlying the
public policy mission is a similar belief that there exists, in practically all
domains, the opportunity to deploy the method to determine the most
efficient course of action. But it is precisely here that the systems fallacy
surfaces again and raises difficulty, just like a crystalline structure (Balkin
1986): the same problems arise of normative choice-of-scope decisions
masquerading as policy science but ultimately shaping political values.
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4.2. Reconstructed Cost-Benefit Analysis

As Geertz (1973) remarks, most ideas begin as large systems and are then
incrementally trimmed to size. A number of scholars have proposed today more chastened versions of CBA to address the many criticisms and
concerns leveled against classical forms of CBA. There have been several
proposals to reconstruct CBA along more pragmatic and flexible lines:
by saving the valuable part of CBA as a tool to assess programs and policies while eliminating the unnecessary accoutrements and by crafting a
humbler, second-best method to guide decision-making.
Cass Sunstein has taken, for many years now, a more limited or what
might be called pragmatic approach to CBA, both in theory and in practice (Sunstein 2001–2, 2002, 2013). Sunstein’s more pragmatic approach
is reflected, by no coincidence, in Obama’s Executive Order No. 13,563,
which suggests, for example, that agencies “may consider (and discuss
qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” Both in
his official functions and in his scholarly writings, Sunstein has helped
soften the edges of CBA, emphasizing a greater recognition of the limits
of quantification, of the difficulties of monetary measures, and of translating everything into dollar equivalents—all the while, though, being a
strong proponent of CBA.
In a similar vein, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, in their book New
Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis and other work, have proposed a
more limited, pragmatic approach (Adler and Posner 2006, 2009). They
suggest that we should think of the method not as an ideal, first-order
technique that provides unassailable answers but rather as a second-best
device for making decisions, one that is more suited to our current epistemological and political condition. The CBA method, they argue, should
be thought of as just that: a decision-making method. And as such, they
argue, it is nothing more than a “rough and ready proxy” for the kind of
welfare analysis that we would ideally want to engage in if we lived in a
perfect world but that is sufficient in the real world to achieve the tasks
at hand (Adler and Posner 2006, p. 25). It should be viewed as a kind
of “weak welfarism” in which “overall well-being is one of a possible
plurality of fundamental moral considerations” (Adler and Posner 2008,
p. S255). In presenting the method in this way, Adler and Posner recognize that there are difficulties with quantification and CBA but argue
that any problems with the method do not cause sufficiently significant
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distortions to warrant concern. A CBA, they argue, should be seen as an
“imperfect decision procedure” that “roughly” provides a best fit (Adler
and Posner 2009, p. 72).
These more pragmatic approaches have introduced certain deontological limits to quantification. So, for instance, in a coauthored report following the Edward Snowden revelations, Sunstein argues that, regardless
of the cost-effectiveness of certain policies, “some safeguards are not subject to balancing at all,” and those include restricting free speech or religion or suppressing legitimate dissent (Clarke et al. 2014, p. 16). Here,
the reconstructed cost-benefit method expressly takes some factors off the
table. It draws deontological limits on the scope of the method itself—
limits that would be entirely antithetical to a full-blown, robust welfare
calculus. In addition, central to many of these reconstructive projects is
the idea of reiterative or retrospective evaluations as a way to properly
update information over time (Clarke et al. 2014, p. 16).
These three components—a more limited decision-making technique,
with certain deontological limits, that is updated through retrospective
analysis—constitute a new, more chastened version of CBA. Some scholars, such as Amy Sinden, refer to this reconstructed version as “cost-
benefit lite” (Sinden 2004, p. 191).
4.3. The Systems Fallacy Remainder

Critics of the new reconstructed cost-benefit approach argue that the earlier criticisms still apply and should thus make us skeptical. As some of
the leading critics—Amy Sinden, Douglas Kysar, and David Driesen—remark, the reconstructed approach “suffer[s] from all the same shortcomings they associate with direct implementation: inaccuracy, vulnerability
to manipulation, and inordinate expense” (Sinden, Kysar, and Driesen
2009, p. 58).
Although these criticisms are valid, it is important to emphasize two
other problems. First, the notion of a second-best decision-making tool
does not resolve the problem of partial maximization: if one believes that
the kind of quantitative analysis that is called for by the reconstructive
project is doable, if one believes that those types of measurements and
metrics are sufficiently reliable to decide, effectively, life-or-death questions, as the proponents of reconstructed CBA suggest, then one would
have to engage in the higher-level welfare analysis, since, as discussed earlier, anything short of that would distort outcomes.
But second, and more important, nothing in the reconstructed project
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addresses the fact that the recurring choice-of-scope decisions are normative questions of political values. Nothing changes the inherently political
character of the central decisions at the heart of CBA. So, once again, it
would be misleading to suggest that the reconstructed CBA offers a neutral or objective, even if limited, determination of policies. It too is a political enterprise involving central questions of political values. Failing to
put that front and center will mean that the method of analysis ultimately
distorts, rather than serves, politics.

5. THE PROPER PLACE OF QUANTIFICATION

It is important to emphasize that the problem of the systems fallacy does
not mean that we should be unsystematic or in any way opposed to rigor
in our evaluation of social policies. To the contrary, understanding the
systems fallacy requires systematic rigor. It also helps to delineate more
precisely the proper place of quantification and modeling in politics. The
systems fallacy reveals the normative choice-of-scope decisions inherent
to systems-analytic methods: the normative dimensions of identifying a
social problem; of imagining a metaphorical system; of setting the boundaries, objectives, and criteria of such a system; and of collecting possible
alternatives to compare. This suggests two possible avenues.
One direction would be to forgo analyses that construct metaphorical
systems and bounded sets of promising alternatives and instead implement public policies on the basis of political values determined through
the democratic process. This alternative would obviate the need for comparative CBA, though it would not necessarily exclude metrics or uses of
benchmarks to assess the individual policies or regulations. Evaluating
the effectiveness of a program would, of course, remain important. If a
program selected on the basis of political values is not contributing to
the political objective or is counterproductive, that is important information to have. For example, if broken-windows policing or stop-and-frisk
policies are not reducing crime, it is important to know in order to decide whether to engage in those enforcement practices (Fagan and Davies
2003; Harcourt and Ludwig 2006, 2007). It is important to remain cognizant of efficacy questions without letting those concerns trump the political balancing of values. But if metrics are going to be used here, their
inclusion should be limited to an individualized analysis along a single
value dimension: the metrics would focus on a single program, not on a

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

442 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 4 7 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 1 8

system or a set of promising alternatives. There are, for example, uses of
benchmarking that have been advocated by scholars such as Christopher
Ansell that stay within a single value dimension (Ansell 2011; Liebman,
Cruikshank, and Ma 2017, p. 417; Sabel and Simon 2011). Such quantitative approaches can stay clear of the systems fallacy by focusing on
a single program or regulation and not on a figurative system or set of
promising alternatives, by concentrating on a single value domain, and by
always being attentive to hidden choice-of-scope issues that might arise.
A second approach is to politicize the public policy and CBA: to explicitly recognize that these methods are not neutral or objective, but
deeply political, and must be determined through democratic political
processes. This would require that every scope decision at every step of
the analysis be subject to a political, not a technocratic, decision-making
process. The key steps would include, at a minimum, the conceptualization and definition of the metaphorical system; the identification of its
boundaries, objectives, and criteria of operation; the collection of alternative policies and the metrics used to assess and compare; and all of the
retrospective analysis and reevaluation. This would not solve the problem
of partial maximization, but it would address a key element of the systems fallacy.
The fact is, decision theorists turned to systems-analytic methods in
large part because total welfare analysis was viewed as too unwieldy for
policy making, but the turn to SA hid the political dimensions that were
more obvious in welfare analysis. If Americans decide to retain a welfarist approach to improve the decision-making process, then we would
have to recognize the inescapable normative work in the choice-of-scope
decisions and ensure that all scope decisions are made at a democratic
political level. We would need to be constantly vigilant about the political value choices and reflective about who is making those choices. We
would need to constantly interrogate how we are constructing the analysis, how it is shaping our politics, and who is benefiting. This would be
an explicitly political approach that would constantly reassess how particular political values are being privileged or discounted, whose interests
are being promoted or ignored, and how political distributions are being
affected. The methods would have to be understood as political—as they
are—not scientific, objective, or neutral.
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6. CONCLUSION

Systems-analytic methods, such as public policy and CBA, grew out of
earlier efforts to systematically and quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of man-machine systems. But extending the method of OR beyond military weapons systems and into broader social policy contexts
has been treacherous and “radical,” to borrow Edward Quade’s term.
It has been radical precisely for the reasons that Quade and his RAND
colleagues suggest: the methods take no position on the relative worth of
different policies that promote starkly different political values, but the
analyses end up significantly reshaping those political values. And that is
the nub of the problem: these methods displace democratic debate over
the political values we hold as a society.
The systems-analytic methods seduce by suggesting the possibility of
avoiding politics, partisanship, or, in James Schlesinger’s view, morality
and by focusing our attention on narrow objectives that no one could
possibly take issue with—like reducing crime or juvenile delinquency. But
the methods mask rather than eliminate value judgments and hide the fact
that the central, pivotal choice-of-scope decisions at every key step of the
analyses are normative political choices through and through. Whenever
we ignore or overlook that, we fall once again into the systems fallacy.
It is possible that the current political reaction against the administrative state and Washington technocrats, reflected in the 2016 presidential
election, and the ensuing dismantling of regulatory institutions are a reaction against an administrative apparatus that silently imposed values
on society under the guise of neutral policy analysis. The political backlash may be, in some part, a rejection of experts imposing political values
outside the democratic process. If so, the proper response may call for
more express political debate over values—over “morality”—rather than
a reinvestment in systems logics, public policy approaches, reconstructed
cost-benefit analyses, or other purportedly scientific methods.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, Frank, and Lisa Heinzerling. 2004. Priceless: On Knowing the Price of
Everything and the Value of Nothing. New York: New Press.
Adler, Matthew D., and Eric A. Posner. 2006. New Foundations of Cost-Benefit
Analysis. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 2008. Happiness Research in Cost-Benefit Analysis. Journal of Legal

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

444 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 4 7 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 1 8

Studies 37:S253–S292.
———. 2009. New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Reply to Professors
Sinden, Kysar, and Driesen. Regulation and Governance 3:72–83.
Amadae, S. M. 2003. Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins
of Rational Choice Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ansell, Christopher K. 2011. Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as
Public Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Balkin, Jack M. 1986. The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought. Rutgers Law
Review 39:1–109.
Beckett, Katherine. 1997. Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary
American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blumstein, Alfred. 2007. An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal Justice System. Operations Research 55(1):14–23.
Chang, Howard F. 2000a. A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility,
and the Pareto Principle. Yale Law Journal 110:173–235.
———. 2000b. The Possibility of a Fair Paretian. Yale Law Journal 110:251–58.
Clarke, Richard A., Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein,
and Peter Swire. 2014. The NSA Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Craswell, Richard. 2003. Kaplow and Shavell on the Substance of Fairness. Journal of Legal Studies 32:245–75.
Dorff, Michael B. 2002. Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow
and Shavell. Southern California Law Review 75:847–99.
Ellingston, John R. 1948. Protecting Our Children from Criminal Careers. Federal
Probation 12(3):34–37.
Fagan, Jeffrey A., and Garth Davies. 2003. Policing Guns: Order Maintenance
and Crime Control in New York. Pp. 191–221 in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, edited by Bernard E. Harcourt. New York: New York University Press.
Fallon, Richard H., Jr. 2003. Should We All Be Welfare Economists? Michigan
Law Review 101:979–1025.
Farber, Daniel A. 2009. Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis. University
of Chicago Law Review 76:1355–1405.
Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler. 2004. Some Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell.
Law and Philosophy 23:73–102.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. Pp. 3–30 in The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Harcourt, Bernard E. 2006. From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. Texas Law Review 84:1751–86.
———. 2013. The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal Law and Procedure:
A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making. Public Law Research Paper
No. 14-562. Columbia Law School, New York.

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

SYSTEMS FALLACY /

445

———. 2014. The Systems Fallacy: The Perils of Systems Analysis, Past and Present. Working paper. Columbia Law School, New York.
Harcourt, Bernard E., and Jens Ludwig. 2006. Broken Windows? New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment. University of Chicago
Law Review 73:271–320.
———. 2007. Erratum. University of Chicago Law Review 74:407.
Harrison, Leonard Vance, and Pryor McNeill Grant. 1938. Youth in the Toils.
New York: Macmillan.
Hausner, Jack. 1975. Determining the Travel Characteristics of Emergency Service
Vehicles. Report No. R-1687-HUD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Jennings, John B. 1973. Analysis of the Night and Weekend Arraignment Parts
in the Bronx and Queens Criminal Courts. Report No. R-1236-NYS. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. 2002. Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 2003. Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences,
and Distributive Justice. Journal of Legal Studies 32:331–62.
Kirby, Maurice W. 2003. Operational Research in War and Peace: The British
Experience from the 1930s to 1970. London: Imperial College Press.
Kornhauser, Lewis A. 2003. Preferences, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions. Journal of Legal Studies 32:303–29.
Kysar, Douglas A. 2007. Discounting . . . on Stilts. University of Chicago Law
Review 74:119–38.
Larson, Richard C. 1971. Response of Emergency Units: The Effects of Barriers,
Discrete Streets, and One-Way Streets. Report No. R-675-HUD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
———. 1973. A Hypercube Queueing Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services. Report No. R-1238-HUD. Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation.
Levitt, Steven D. 2004. Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors
That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1):163–90.
Liebman, James S., Elizabeth Cruikshank, and Christina Ma. 2017. Governance
of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Public Education Reform.
Florida Law Review 69:365–463.
Liechenstein, Michael I. 1971. Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives. Working Paper No. P-4656.
New York City–RAND Institute, New York.
Light, Jennifer S. 2003. From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. The Science of “Muddling Through.” Public Administration Review 19:79–88.

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

446 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 4 7 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 1 8

———. 1979. Still Muddling, Not Yet Through. Public Administration Review
39:517–26.
MacCormick, Austin H. 1942. Existing Provisions for the Correction of Youthful
Offenders. Law and Contemporary Problems 9:588–99.
New York Times. 1971. Golar Acts to Bolster Security in City Projects. November
18, p. 52.
Operational Research Society of Great Britain. 1962. News and Notes. Operational Research Quarterly 13:279–86.
Phillips, Orie L. 1942. The Criminal Youth Problem. American Bar Association
Journal 28:581–85.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
1967. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Quade, Edward S. 1966. Systems Analysis Techniques for Planning-Programming-
Budgeting. Working Paper No. P-3322. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
CA.
Ranzal, Edward. 1973. Guards to Be Hired to Protect Vest-Pocket Housing Projects. New York Times, April 18, p. 51.
Rosenthal, Jack. 1972. Housing Study: High Rise = High Crime. New York
Times, October 26, p. 45.
Rubin, Edward L. 2013. Public Policy and the Methodology of Statutory Design.
Paper presented at the Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop, New
York, September 30.
Sabel, Charles F., and William H. Simon. 2011. Minimalism and Experimentalism
in the Administrative State. Georgetown Law Journal 100:53–93.
Schlesinger, James R. 1963. Quantitative Analysis and National Security. World
Politics 15:295–315.
Seigel, Max H. 1972. Welfare-Hotel Crime Is a Local Problem. New York Times,
November 19, p. 62.
Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organizations. 4th ed. New York: Free Press.
Sinden, Amy. 2004. Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Analysis: Economics for Liberals. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 29:191–242.
Sinden, Amy, Douglas A. Kysar, and David M. Driesen. 2009. Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand. Regulation and Governance 3:48–71.
Singer, Joseph William. 2002. Something Important in Humanity. Harvard Civil
Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 37:103–30.
Smith, Bruce L. R. 1966. The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Stewart, Hamish. 2004. Persons and Their Well-Being: A Critical Discussion of
Kaplow and Shavell’s Fairness versus Welfare. Queen’s Law Journal 30:1–34.
Stokey, Edith, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1978. A Primer for Policy Analysis. New
York: W. W. Norton.

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

SYSTEMS FALLACY /

447

Sunstein, Cass R. 2001–2. The Arithmetic of Arsenic. Georgetown Law Journal
90:2255–2309.
———. 2002. The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection. Chicago: American Bar Association.
———. 2013. Nonquantifiable. Working paper. Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA.
US Army Air Force. 1945. AAF Bombing Accuracy. Washington, DC: Research
and Analysis Branch Office of Statistical Control.
US General Accounting Office. 1969. Survey of Progress in Implementing the
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in Executive Agencies: Report to
the Congress. Washington, DC: Comptroller General of the United States.
Waldron, Jeremy. 2003. Locating Distribution. Journal of Legal Studies 32:277–
302.

This content downloaded from 128.059.191.084 on April 01, 2020 06:45:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

